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Chapter 3
Uncertainty and Narratives of the Future: 
A Theoretical Framework 
for Contemporary Fertility
Daniele Vignoli, Giacomo Bazzani, Raffaele Guetto, Alessandra Minello, 
and Elena Pirani
3.1  Introduction
Understanding the relationship between economic and fertility trends is a challenge 
for demographic research. Karaman Örsal and Goldstein (2018) took a large group 
of middle–high income countries and looked at the relevant data from the post–war 
period onwards. They showed that, since 1970, good economic conditions have led 
to higher fertility, while bad economic conditions mean lower fertility, suggesting a 
pro–cyclical trend (see also Myrskylä et  al. 2009). However, a close look at the 
demographic trends at the beginning of the twenty-first century casts doubts on this 
kind of interpretation. Economic indicators suggest that European countries are cur-
rently moving out of the Great Recession, whereas fertility trends are not so posi-
tive. For instance, in 2009 Northern European economies resumed economic 
growth, but their total fertility started to decrease substantially. In Norway, total 
fertility dropped from 1.98 in 2009 to 1.6 in 2018, the lowest ever in peacetime; 
similar changes, and even lower fertility levels, have been observed in Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland and Sweden (Comolli et al. 2019). On the other side of Europe, 
Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain, after a period of fertility 
rebound, re–entered, in the same period, a regime of lowest–low fertility, with total 
fertility around 1.3.
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Imaginative forecast of the future is this forerunning quality of 
behavior rendered available for guidance in the present.
John Dewey
26
Explanations for fertility decisions based on structural constraints—such as 
labor, housing condition, or income—may account for a substantial share of cross–
country differences in fertility, nevertheless important questions remain unan-
swered, posing major challenges to contemporary demographic theories. Given the 
disjuncture between economic and fertility trends, what are the drivers of the low 
fertility in contemporary European societies? The central explanation we put for-
ward for this new state–of–affairs is the rise of uncertainty. The future is inevitably 
uncertain, and uncertainty is a structural factor implied in any long–term decision–
making process, such as the fertility choice. In addition to this fundamental uncer-
tainty, though, we would argue that recent economic developments in 
Europe—namely, the increasing speed and volatility of outcomes of globalization, 
and the new wave of technological changes—have amplified uncertainty in people’s 
life, adding a contingent component of economic uncertainty. Economic uncertainty 
makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to imagine their future, choose 
between alternatives, and form strategies.
Notwithstanding its theoretical importance, uncertainty is rarely considered in 
traditional explanations of fertility. We suggest that the interpretation of recent fer-
tility trends needs a clear action theory where uncertainty has a central role. We 
argue that fundamental uncertainty needs to be conceptualized and operationalized 
taking into account that people use works of imagination, producing their own nar-
rative of the future—i.e. imagined futures embedded in social elements and their 
interactions. The medium and long–term future cannot be predicted with any degree 
of certainty, but people can sketch out their personal narratives of the future, and, on 
the basis of these, take decisions. In the “life course cube”, a re-conceptualization of 
the life course as a set of interdependences between time, life domains, and levels of 
analysis, this is referred to as the “shadows of the future” (Bernardi et al. 2019: 4). 
The narratives of the future become potent driving forces for fertility intentions: 
people might plan a child according to or despite uncertainty, irrespective of struc-
tural constraints and their subjective perceptions. Fertility intentions follow the 
desire for childbearing and anticipate concrete behavior by reflecting the combined 
effect of desired fertility and situational constraints (Thomson and Brandreth 1995). 
Fertility intentions have been generally regarded as a fairly suitable predictor of 
behavior at the individual level (Westoff and Ryder 1977; Schoen et al. 1999), pro-
vided that a time frame for the realization of the intention is set (Régnier-Loilier and 
Vignoli 2011).
We continue by offering a view on the main conceptualizations of uncertainty 
and defining the theoretical perspective we adopt. Then, a brief review of existing 
theories on reproductive behavior, from past to more recent theoretical approaches, 
is presented. Overall, each one of the previous approaches added various and novel 
tesserae to the mosaic of low fertility; nevertheless, none of them explicitly 
addressed the role of (rising) uncertainty. We continue by proposing a novel frame-
work (the Narrative Framework) for the study of fertility decisions under uncertain 
conditions based on expectations, imaginaries and narratives: we argue that narra-
tives of the future might help to disentangle the nature and the role of the elements 
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involved in the fertility decision–making process. Then, we address the causal 
validity of the narrative framework for contemporary fertility. We conclude by high-
lighting the advantages of taking into account narratives of the future in fertility 
research.
3.2  The Notion of Uncertainty
In the literature, there is an ongoing debate over the definition of uncertainty and its 
relevance for social dynamics. A valuable starting point is the classical work of 
Knight ([1921] 2006), who distinguished between risk and uncertainty. In a risky 
condition, the probability distribution of future events is completely known, and 
outcomes can be calculated or, at least, estimated by classifying on the basis of a 
known probability; in an uncertain condition, outcomes are not homogeneous 
enough to be estimated through probability calculus, or they are purely unknown. 
More recent definitions of uncertainty do not pose a particular challenge to the 
Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, but they highlight specific, or 
recurrent, features in the proposed notions of uncertainty. In Table 3.1, we offer a 
synthetic schema of the most important definitions of uncertainty given in the recent 
economic and sociological literature, classifying various types of uncertainty by 
their source. All the identified conditions of uncertainty imply that future outcomes 
cannot be measured probabilistically.
A common source in creating personal uncertainty for a given actor, that we find 
in some but not all authors’ conceptualizations, are social interactions and the roles 
of other actors. Human behavior can never be totally predicted. Thus, personal deci-
sions and plans based on others’ expected (rational) actions may easily fail. 
Individuals may learn from past experiences, reflect on their cognitive processes, 
and act strategically using their imagination and creativity: these capacities allow 
them to shift away from the expected course of action. A second conceptualization 
of uncertainty focuses on the quality and the quantity of the available information 
needed for the selection and evaluation of the alternative courses of actions and their 
consequences. Uncertainty may arise because information is missing or because 
there is no feasible access to information due to ignorance or because of the limited 
time availability for collecting it. Finally, the last column of Table 3.1 shows the 
more radical condition of uncertainty, or fundamental uncertainty, that can be an 
effect of the other two, but may also arise independently. Under fundamental uncer-
tainty, the effects of the present action cannot be successfully forecast or estimated; 
the list of possible future outcomes is not complete, nor can the elements involved 
in the course of action and their roles be known with precision.
In the context of reproductive behavior, a fertility decision is always taken in a 
condition of fundamental uncertainty: despite the level of uncertainty experienced 
by individuals and couples, a fertility decision has to be taken in the present. 
Through this decision, people plant a seed that will germinate and grow in their 
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short– and long–term future. Parenthood is a unique and irreversible experience, 
where what can be learned from the past does not often apply to the present and to 
the future, not least because children change like their parents through the years, 
and because children differ from one another.
Fundamental uncertainty has always accompanied fertility decisions; this is not 
a novelty, then. Nevertheless, recent societal changes experienced by post–indus-
trial societies—i.e. changes classified under the umbrella of globalization, and the 
Table 3.1 Types of uncertainty classified by their sources




uncertainty: a complex 
situation involving too 
much information that 
cannot be computed
Ontological uncertainty: creativity 
and innovation cannot be 





information is missing 
or cannot be accessed
Fundamental uncertainty: the 
creativity implied in the future 







are uncertain about 
what a proposition 
of other actors 
means
Truth uncertainty: 
actors are uncertain 
about whether well–
defined propositions of 
future consequences are 
true or not
Ontological uncertainty: refers to 
the entities that inhabit the world, 
their modes of interaction, and the 





strategic action of 
other actors is a 






information cannot be 
rationally stopped
Brute uncertainty: no uniform 








predicted, even in 
game theory models
Complexity 
uncertainty: a complex 
situation does not allow 
utility maximization
Fundamental uncertainty: 
innovation is unpredictable and 






Radical uncertainty: equivocal 
situations in which uncertainty 
about the outcomes of actions is so 
profound that it is both difficult to 
set up the problem structure to 
choose between alternatives and 
impossible to represent the future in 
terms of a knowable and exhaustive 
list of outcomes to which to attach 
probabilities
Own elaboration based on Beckert (2016)
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neo–liberal policies that accompanied it—added new contingent elements of uncer-
tainty to life plans. The impact of economic uncertainty on demographic behavior 
has been at the core of demographic research since its earliest years. However, it has 
been recognized that a “harsh new world of economic insecurity” (Hacker 2019: 
xvi) only appeared as of the 1980s. This was a world characterized not only by 
increasing instability in individuals’ employment, but also by rising inequalities 
(OECD 2011). Although inequality and uncertainty in the economic context are not 
the same thing, they are strongly interwoven (Hacker 2019). In the era of globaliza-
tion, economic uncertainty is also amplified by the intensification of worldwide 
social relations through the information and technology revolution. Social interac-
tions are more and more numerous and complex, and the media often multiply 
uncertainty as growing information does not imply its intelligibility and utility. For 
a majority of citizens, the media are an essential source of information on complex 
economic issues (Boomgaarden et al. 2011), which also evaluate, filter, and simplify 
information. The perception of economic uncertainty is thus strongly anchored in 
public images produced by the media and other leading opinion formers, like politi-
cians. During the years of the Great Recession, media news contributed to the emer-
gence of a European public sphere with a pessimistic view of a stagnant, 
underperforming continent (Davis Cross and Ma 2013). The Great Recession was 
popularized by a tsunami of news that focused on the crisis as the evil of contempo-
rary European societies (Cepernich 2012), even in countries that did not experience 
a real economic recession. This is a novelty compared to previous recessions. In the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, when a rapid surge in unemployment was followed 
by a drastic drop in fertility, economic information was not as amplified and dif-
fused as it is in the era of globalization.
Classical theoretical perspectives on fertility did not deal with the issue of funda-
mental uncertainty, nor with the increased salience of uncertainty due to globaliza-
tion dynamics. In the Narrative Framework, we acknowledge the concept of 
uncertainty and study how a fertility decision can be taken according to or despite it.
3.3  Classical Perspectives on Low Fertility
In the second half of the twentieth century, the two most influential perspectives on 
fertility have been the New Home Economics (NHE) (Becker 1964) and the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT) (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995). Becker 
(1981), following a strict microeconomic approach, considers fertility behavior as 
an individual action oriented to utility maximization. The concept of utility remains 
largely undetermined (Strandbakken 2017), but thanks to this indeterminacy the 
microeconomic approach has been applied to family decisions as well as to almost 
all domains of social life. Utility maximization implies that the availability of higher 
economic resources—driven, for example, by the increasing contribution of women 
to household income—may have ambiguous effects on fertility. On the one hand, 
women’s employment fuels permanent (household) income and may foster fertility 
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(income effect). On the other hand, women’s employment reduces the time for chil-
drearing; therefore, working and having children may become competing tasks 
(substitution effect). Sociological approaches refer to the latter mechanism as evi-
dence of role incompatibility—or the inability to combine mother and worker roles 
in a modern economy where home and workplace are separated. Despite the exis-
tence of empirical evidence on this kind of substitution effect (Matysiak and Vignoli 
2008, 2013), the application of a strict economic approach to fertility behavior may 
create a stylized and unrealistic type of family agency,1 in which partners calculate 
the costs and benefits of a child, discounting the actual cost in the light of future 
utility (Caldwell 1982). Usually, human actions are a mix of different ideal types of 
agency (Weber 1978 [1922]), and fertility decisions, in particular, are complex deci-
sions where interests, values, opportunities, and social ties interact. For example, a 
different explanation for declining fertility in spite of increasing levels of household 
income is provided by Schoen et al. (1997). They opposed simplifying the fertility 
decision to the economic cost of children, and claimed for their value as social 
resources: As kin ties weaken and children bring comparatively fewer social or eco-
nomic resources to their parents, fertility is unlikely to recover in low–fertility 
populations.
The other classical perspective on low fertility, the Second Demographic 
Transition (SDT; van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995), builds, instead, on the socio-
logical foundations of value change and individualization. The idea is that, in post–
modern societies, individuals, in particular women, reprioritize career and 
self–actualization over family and childbearing. Even if not stated explicitly in the 
original formulation of the theory, this argument has often been used to argue that 
the increase in women’s education and employment anticipated fertility decline in 
Western countries during the second half of the twentieth century (Guetto 
et al. 2015).
The SDT does not contemplate economic uncertainty, and from the NHE one can 
only indirectly conclude that it may matter. Income level is important because peo-
ple make decisions subject to budget constraints and if the budget is uncertain, they 
cannot make such decisions. Generally speaking, in these two frameworks the 
demand for fertility is conceived as being determined by permanent (household) 
income, the opportunity cost of children, tastes, and self–realization needs—all fac-
tors assumed to be relatively stable over individuals’ life courses, and subject to a 
very slow pace of change at the societal level. In recent years, however, the role of 
(increasingly pervasive) uncertainty cannot be disregarded in the fertility decision–
making process. After all, on this uncertainty will depend important fluctuations in 
income, wealth, and preferences (Hacker 2019).
More recent developments in demographic theory stress the importance of gen-
der equity within couples and at the societal level in understanding trends and 
cross–country differences in fertility rates (McDonald 2000). According to the 
1 The concept of agency refers to the human capacity to act independently or strategically irrespec-
tive of the influence of the social structure (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 988).
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theory of multiple equilibria (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015) or gender revolu-
tion (Goldscheider et al. 2015), (very) low fertility rates would be a temporary phe-
nomenon following the rise in female employment. However, fertility rates would, 
these theories proffer, tend to return to replacement level as societies adapt to new 
women’s roles. Beyond being challenged by the recent evidence of a fertility fall in 
gender–egalitarian Nordic countries, this approach does not assign any relevant role 
to rising uncertainty. The change in gender role attitudes in recent decades have 
inspired a further interpretative line. Specifically, the diverging perspectives between 
the male and the female member of the couple, namely any competition between 
them, have been argued to be an underappreciated element in the literature. This 
competition, it is suggested, would potentially foster a retreat from marriage and 
contribute to low fertility as men increasingly withhold economic support from their 
children (Schoen 2010). Once again, even if economic aspects are part of the frame-
work, especially in terms of power in the relationship, uncertainty is not accounted for.
3.4  Objective or Perceived Economy?
In demographic research, economic uncertainty has so far been viewed as an indi-
vidual risk factor, mainly related to the labor market (e.g., unemployment, short–
term contract jobs, underemployment, or a combination of these; Mills and Blossfeld 
2013; Vignoli et al. 2012, 2019; Dantis and Rizzi 2020). A persistent experience of 
employment uncertainty may lead to the perpetual postponement of family forma-
tion and, as a result, to a smaller family or even to no family at all (Busetta et al. 
2019). Several studies tried to assess the effect of objective employment indicators 
on fertility (see Alderotti et al. 2019 for a meta–analysis of micro–level research 
findings for Europe). What is generally not considered in these studies is that objec-
tive indicators alone are perhaps not good proxies of the perceived economic condi-
tion, because individuals differ in the extent to which they feel, tolerate and react to 
the same objective condition.
In the light of these limitations, a different stream of research focused on the 
effects of perceived economic uncertainty on fertility. Ranjan (1999) claimed that 
perceived economic uncertainty played an important role in fertility trends in post–
communist countries after the communist regimes had collapsed there. In the last 
years, information regarding perceived economic conditions is more frequently 
included in surveys. For instance, the availability of individuals’ perception of eco-
nomic  conditions in the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), enabled 
Kreyenfeld (2009, 2016), Bhaumik and Nugent (2011) and Hofmann and Hohmeyer 
(2013) to explore its relationship with fertility. Even if these studies recognized that 
fertility choices are not only influenced by the objective side of uncertainty, they fail 
to recognize the future-oriented nature of uncertainty.
An increasingly popular approach used in demography to identify the fertility 
decision–making process is the socio–psychological framework of the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 1991), which stems from the Theory of Reasoned 
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Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). In this conceptual model, an action is the result 
of actors’ attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms (dependent on the rele-
vant others’ perceptions of the behavior) and perceived behavioral control (self–
efficacy) (Ajzen and Klobas 2013). These constructs are operationalized within the 
TPB in a hypothetical situation in the next three years. The empirical validation of 
the TPB is highly problematic and much debated (Schoen et al. 1999), especially in 
terms of the role of background factors and structural constraints (Mencarini et al. 
2015). Nonetheless, the TPB is one of the few forward–looking approaches devel-
oped for the study of a fertility decision–making process. The TPB tries to predict 
fertility behavior with a set of elements that still rely on a deterministic approach, 
disregarding an individual’s capacity to deviate from the expected course of action. 
From our perspective, hence, the TPB misses one crucial element in its forward–
looking approach, namely the imaginative capacity of human agency. In the 
Narrative Framework, the TPB elements are part of the structural constraints that 
shape the course of action, but individuals may also deviate from an expected course 
of action thanks to their imaginative capacity.
3.5  The Narrative Framework
We propose a conceptual framework—the Narrative Framework—to investigate the 
fertility decision–making process in a state of fundamental uncertainty. The study 
of the future is a growing field in many branches of economics, sociology, psychol-
ogy, psychoanalysis and anthropology, but it is still not considered while analyzing 
contemporary fertility. We build upon these theoretical bases, complementing our 
proposal with a conceptual distinction between expectations, imaginaries and 
narratives.
In real life, the separation between expectations, imaginaries and narratives is 
often blurred, not least because each one influences the other. For analytical pur-
poses, a conceptual distinction is necessary, however. People form their own expec-
tations on the basis of structural and contingent constraints. Although expectations 
come from structural constraints and past experiences, their influence is not deter-
ministic, and the knowledge of the past does not include all future possibilities: the 
future is not merely a “statistical shadow of the past” (Davidson 2010: 17; Beckert 
and Bronk 2018). Expectations are thus the foundation for the imaginaries of the 
future, although they often do not coincide. Imaginaries draw on expectations, but 
they may also deviate from the expected future, thanks to the imaginative capacity 
of humans. Structural constraints, expectations and imaginaries find their proper 
place in narratives of the future, the less abstract level of the imaginative capacity, 
able to sort them in an intelligible and actionable manner. The aforementioned ele-
ments are included in the narrative of the future and, at this level, they influence 
fertility intentions. We propose a graphical representation to better exemplify the 
decision–making process (Fig.  3.1). Each of the four levels—narratives of the 
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future, imaginaries, expectations and structural constraints—stems from the previ-
ous, but it is not fully determined by it; in fact, each element can exceed what can 
be expected from the previous elements. Fertility intentions, of course, will also 
have effects on the structural constraints and the past experiences of the next courses 
of action.
The fertility decision–making process is a clear example of a situation of funda-
mental uncertainty where expectations, imaginaries and narratives of the future 
matter together with any structural constraints and past experiences. Typical ques-
tions arising during the decision–making process are related to structural con-
straints: they might be of a micro nature (e.g., housing or labor circumstances), of a 
meso nature (e.g., the role of familial or friendship networks), or of a macro nature 
(e.g., the context for balancing paid work and family life). But these objective con-
ditions cannot alone predict fertility intentions: Facing the same structural con-
straints, people do not necessarily make the same choices. For example, an uncertain 
labor condition may not be an obstacle to having a child if strong economic growth 
is expected, but it may inhibit fertility when coupled with the expectation of eco-
nomic decline (expectations). However, neither expectations nor structural con-
straints alone can predict a fertility decision: human beings still have agency—i.e. 
an imaginative capacity, something which allows them to deviate from the expected 
course of action. For example, a wishful future involving numerous descendants or 
a strong belief in the sacredness of family (imaginaries) may encourage childbear-
ing notwithstanding adverse economic expectations or a condition of income hard-
ship. Expectations and structural constraints together with (family) imaginaries 
contribute to the definition of a narrative of the future driving the fertility decision–
making process. Here positive fertility intentions may be formulated despite the 
uncertainty of the future or fertility may be avoided according to the condition of 
uncertainty.
Fig. 3.1 Fertility 
decision–making process 
under conditions of 
uncertainty: a stylized 
representation of the 
Narrative Framework
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The following subsections present the different elements of the narrative theo-
retical framework.
3.5.1  Structural Constraints
The contingency of action under uncertain conditions is limited by structural con-
straints, such as cultural frames, conventions, rules, and institutional settings 
(Beckert and Bronk 2018). All these elements reduce the potentially limitless pos-
sibilities of action by imposing a limitation (Offe 1998). This limitation, however, 
does not imply the entire predictability of the future. Indeed, the limitations deriving 
from structural constraints can be encouraged, moderated or thwarted by the agency 
of the elements involved (i.e., individuals, organizations, social groups, technology, 
and so forth) and by their contingent interpretations.
The fertility decision-making process  is  clearly influenced by the presence of 
structural constraints. In Western countries, the fall in fertility rate from the first to the 
second generations of migrants from high–fertility countries shows how the social 
context influences fertility decisions (Kulu 2005). Different generations of immi-
grants are, indeed, influenced by different structural constraints: local cultural values, 
as opposed to country of origin cultural values, seem to affect fertility decisions dif-
ferently for the first and the second generations of immigrants. While the fertility 
decisions of first–generation migrants are likely to be strongly influenced by the pre-
dominant cultural values in the origin countries, second–generation migrants, being 
exposed to cultural values of the destination country, are more likely to distance them-
selves from the values of their parents (Guetto and Panichella 2013). In this case, the 
influence of the social context in fertility decision varies in relation to the age and the 
period of exposure to a different culture and institutional setting over the life course.
The influence of the structural constraints on decision and action is not always 
mechanical, however. Bourdieu ([1980] 1990), for example, referred to the concept 
of habitus as, also, a resource for action. In his original framework, the habitus, 
shaped by past experiences, is incorporated into the body with a pre–conscious set 
of expectations about the future. Nonetheless, structural constraints, despite being 
naturalized and taken for granted, can also be “strategically mobilized in accor-
dance with the contingencies of particular empirical situations” (Emirbayer and 
Mische 1998: 978). Structural constraints often shape the life course with a silent 
reduction in possible actions. But they can also be strategically used by the actors, 
for example thorough their inclusion or exclusion in an expected future. Within the 
second generations of migrants it may, for example, happen that the traditional val-
ues of the country of origin are deliberately used to build a personal identity differ-
ent from that of native peers. In this case, the number of children may increase 
despite the expected influence of local cultural values, thanks to the strategic use of 
structural constraints.
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3.5.2  Expectations
Beliefs about the future are the compass guiding the decision–making process: 
“When making decisions, actors associate certain future results with the course of 
action they are contemplating, connecting numerous outcomes with different pos-
sible decisions. These perceptions are known as expectations” (Beckert 2016: 35). 
Expectations represent the whole complex system of beliefs about the future that an 
individual takes into consideration in the decision–making process. Past experi-
ences act in a fundamental way here, but the past cannot determine the outcome of 
the process per se: expectations of the future play a key role in selecting actionable 
decisions from the available set.
In the social sciences, expectations have taken on different roles and levels of 
importance in action theory, across the years and across different disciplines. 
Sociological approaches have traditionally been more interested in understanding 
the role of the past in explaining present actions than in the role of expected futures. 
Even when expectations are considered as an essential part of a given course of 
action, they seem to reflect something that has already happened in the past. Schütz 
(1962), for instance, devotes particular attention to the role of expectations in his 
theory of action: expected typicality of the events informs the course of action. 
However, typicality remains a concept anchored in the past and cannot account for 
the role of expectations and individual agency in social reality.2 On the other side, 
expectations of future gain, or utility, play a key role in economists’ accounts of 
economic dynamics. In mainstream economics, the possibility of an expected long–
term equilibrium in the markets is connected to the capacity of individuals to fore-
cast successfully and to make investments and consumptions in the light of this 
predicted future.
In our Narrative Framework, let us imagine a hypothetical young woman in her 
late twenties, one who has completed her education. Supported by her social and 
cultural environment, which promotes a two–children norm, she might expect a 
future family with children. This family expectation, however, clashes with her eco-
nomic expectations: she thinks she will never get a permanent contract, at least not 
in the near future; moreover, she is concerned about possible difficulties in reconcil-
ing work and family. This example suggests how expectations are embodied in the 
currently available set of actions and influence the decision–making process, until a 
fertility intention is formulated. Regardless of their truthfulness, rationality or plau-
sibility, expectations are real, and able to guide the fertility decision–making pro-
cess. Expectations shape an expected future, but human agency may deviate from 
the expected course of action toward an imagined future.
2 The role of future expectations has also been considered in sociological approaches relying on 
some forms of Rational Action Theory, such as in the field of social stratification and inequality 
(Goldthorpe 2007), as well as in the stream of research focusing on the educational aspirations of 
immigrants and their descendants (Kao and Tienda 1995).
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3.5.3  Imaginaries
Imagination is the capacity to place oneself in one or more imagined situations, 
hypothesizing their effects. But also, and more radically, it means the capacity to 
imagine a wishful future that cannot be deducted from the present. Imaginaries are 
imagined futures that join together elements of the present with some normative 
value orientations; they can be related to collective outcomes (e.g., an egalitarian or 
a carbon–free society) but also to individual goals (e.g., a family with many children 
or living in a house with a pool). Fertility decisions are often connected with a fam-
ily imaginary that may be seen either as being wishful (e.g., because of the parent-
hood experience) or as being frightening (e.g., because of the reduction in free time).
Importantly, imaginaries can themselves be a cause of uncertain futures because 
they make people deviate from the expected future. They also represent an impor-
tant tool to cope with uncertainty: imaginaries allow actors to move beyond inher-
ited thought–patterns and categories; to invent entirely novel ideas; to spot emerging 
patterns; to choose between visualized but counterfactual options (Bronk 2009). 
Imaginaries help to de–routinize the course of action by replacing routines with 
action models characterized by a higher level of consciousness and reflexivity.
Continuing with our previous example, in the imagined future our hypothetical 
young woman sees herself married with two children in an owner occupied home, 
close to her parents who may help her. Possibly she has a permanent job contract.
3.5.4  Narratives
The gap between imaginaries and the present course of action is filled by narra-
tives.3 When imaginaries are associated with a hypothetical course of action, they 
constitute a narrative of the future. The interplay between structural constraints and 
agency can be disentangled through the study of narratives that, especially for long–
term decisions, provide a goal and show how it can be reached with specific ele-
ments, actions, and limitations. In this sense, a narrative of the future subsumes 
structural constraints, expectations, and imaginaries. Narratives of the future per-
form four functions: (i) they select the key elements of the story and avoid what is 
considered irrelevant for the events at stake (selection); (ii) they interpret their value 
and meaning (interpretation); (iii) they connect the elements in temporal order iden-
tifying the causes and effects of the action (causal modelling); and iv) they support 
the action rationally and emotionally (action support) (Fig. 3.2).
The selection process refers to a basic cognitive function. During social action, 
actors can only focus attention on a small number of elements. For example, what 
3 There are different meanings of narratives across different disciplines, and a review of the use of 
the term is far beyond the scope of this chapter (for an introduction, see Emirbayer and 
Mische 1998).
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matters most in the conscious deliberation of a fertility decision between personal 
and partner’s labor contracts, household income and savings, housing condition, 
public services or peers’ and parents’ opinions is not obvious. Relevant information 
for the decision process is selected—consciously or unconsciously—from an almost 
infinite possible set. In any given moment, social action can consider only a limited 
set of elements and information, both because of cognitive limitations and because 
of the risk of inaction due to excess information. The zone of attention contains both 
preconscious elements, given by the habitus, as well as innovative elements, given 
by the capacity of imagination.
The interpretation process of the selected elements consists of two main phases: 
typification and classification. The first step of an actor in interacting with a new 
element of the context is the recognition of the new element’s analogies with things 
already experienced, namely typification (Schütz 1967). The second step is to clas-
sify the selected elements. For example, after the selection of the stability of labor 
contract as a key element in the fertility decision–making process, the next step 
would be to assess to what extent the current contract can be considered as being 
stable. The classification process often follows a matrix of binary oppositions (Lévi- 
Strauss 1963) (e.g., stable/precarious, enough/not enough, short–term/long–term), 
but it may also involve a more complex system of relationships (e.g., economic sec-
tors). Lines of separation may be nuanced and the classification of elements may not 
be easy, especially in long–term decisions where there is fundamental uncertainty. 
The classification process always happens in the light of specific imaginaries. While 
imaginaries may remain in the background in a decision–making process with clear 
alternative outcomes, in the case of a decision involving fundamental uncertainty, a 
narrative of the future tries to align the selected elements in the direction of the 
imagined future. For example, while in many cases unemployment is considered as 
Fig. 3.2 From imaginaries to fertility intentions: the four functions performed by a narrative of 
the future
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a deterrent to parenthood, its expected negative influence on plans for parenthood 
may be overlooked when there is an imagined wished–for future involving a child.
The definition of the necessary conditions for reaching the goal (e.g., a family 
with children) implies a causal path involving the indispensable elements to achieve 
the imaginary (e.g., a stable job is necessary to save money and to rent a house with 
n bedrooms and thus to plan childbearing). The process of setting the necessary 
conditions and elements for reaching the goal is the causal modelling function of 
the narratives of the future. Thanks to the capacity of the imagination, people may 
consider alternative combinations of elements or means–end sequences.
Narratives reflect the interplay between individual agency and structural con-
straints in a given context. Narratives help people to coordinate their social action in 
a condition of uncertainty, and allow for the construction of everyday meanings and 
their implicit causal mechanisms (Bruner 1990). The connection between the social 
elements of the past, present and future through causal mechanisms also sustains the 
emotional commitment of individuals to act despite or according to the uncertainty 
they face (the action support function of narratives).
All in all, narratives provide reasons for action. Irrespective of the extent to 
which these narratives may be false or the actions questionable, they have the power 
to reduce world complexity (selection process). Narratives make a given environ-
ment more intelligible and actionable (thanks to interpretation and causal modeling) 
and support the ongoing efforts of dealing with uncertainty (action support). 
Importantly, the more the decision to be taken has important, long–term effects, as 
in the case of fertility, the more a conscious narrative of the future is needed to help 
with selection, interpretation, causal modeling and to support the action. To con-
clude the example introduced in the previous Sections, our young woman could 
assign a prevailing importance to the pre–conditions considered as necessary to start 
a family and under which children should be raised (e.g., property ownership and a 
good income). In a first phase this leads our young woman to postpone childbearing 
in order to achieve economic stability. Then, while keeping faith with her two–chil-
dren fertility ideal, approaching her mid–thirties she might consider having only 
one child as a way to adhere at least partially to her imagined future.
Personal narratives of the future are not only a matter of psychological attitudes 
or individual intentionality, but they are also the place where the social context 
(structural constraints) takes an intelligible form and provide elements and reasons 
for action. They are the hinge that keeps the link between individual and society, 
favoring their mutual influence and interdependence and, at the same time, allowing 
for a separate accounting of both sides. Personal narratives will never be totally 
socialized, nor can they ever be totally independent of context. Hence, personal nar-
ratives of the future are anchored in existing cultural and institutional frames, as 
well as public images produced by the media and other powerful opinion formers. 
Based on socially–constructed perceptions, people build their personal narratives of 
the future to act according to or in spite of uncertainty, irrespective of structural 
constraints and their subjective perceptions. The building blocks of personal narra-
tives are thus shared narratives produced by several agents of socialization, such as 
parents, peers and the media (Vignoli et  al. 2020a). Through the analysis of 
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narratives and their building blocks the researcher can find hints to put together the 
causal explanatory chain of fertility, which is under construction.
3.6  The Causal Power of Narratives
We posit that in an era of amplified and pervasive uncertainty the role of narratives 
of the future gain importance in facilitating or inhibiting fertility decisions irrespec-
tive of—objective and subjective—structural constraints. The Narrative Framework, 
however, shares together with other explanatory models of social action the two 
main problems of nomological explanations described by Davidson: namely spe-
cific causality and generic causality problems (Davidson 1980 [1976]). First, the 
narrative explanation is not backed up by a general law able to explain all similar 
actions under the same law (specific causality problem): another mental status may 
cause the same action. Second, the narrative explanation cannot state what is the 
final cause of the phenomenon observed (the generic causality problem): another 
level in the causal chain may represent a deeper level in causal explanation, for 
example, hormones or neurological connections.
Narratives may actually be invoked as a way of dealing with the specific causal-
ity problem, contributing to “choosing among various plausible interpretations of an 
action in terms of possible reasons” (Stueber 2008: 42). Notwithstanding the fact 
that different (pre or post) rationalizations of fertility decision will always be pos-
sible, narratives attribute reason(s) to the action. Using the words of Uebel (2012: 
43–44), narratives “deepen the causal claim by spelling out the context of the attrib-
uted reason, embedded in a personal and social history”. In this sense, a personal 
narrative may be able to explain the intention to have a child, although this does not 
necessarily impede alternative narratives in the mind of another person with the 
same constraints. For example, the question of whether the increase in objective 
economic uncertainty may inhibit fertility intentions (Busetta et al. 2019), or rather 
facilitates them (consistently with the uncertainty reduction framework; Friedman 
et al. 1994) cannot be solved under a generic law. Only in the light of a narrative of 
the future, do the objective indicators of economic uncertainty find their proper role 
(selection) and value (interpretation) in relation to fertility intentions (causal model-
ing), providing individuals with sufficient levels of commitment to allow for action 
(action support).
As stated, the causal chain may always have one more deep level, internal or 
external to individuals, to be used as the final causal reason to act (Freese 2009). The 
concept of mechanism helps in framing the limits of the causal chain in the social 
sciences, and, particularly, in the Narrative Framework. An explanation based on 
social mechanisms does not aspire to set up the final cause over the observed event; 
instead, it seeks to explain how the action is brought about and under which condi-
tions it can take place (Hedström 2005). Whereas this aim is shared by numerous 
explanatory models, the added value of the mechanisms approach is to describe the 
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elements of a continuous and contiguous causal chain (Hedström and Swedberg 
1998; Hedström and Bearman 2009) leading to fertility decisions.
The claim for the continuity and contiguity of causes of the decision–making 
process allows for a shift in the focus from the final cause to the plausibility of this 
cause in the light of the whole action chain under consideration. In this sense, the 
economic uncertainty that permeates contemporary globalized societies may be 
seen only with difficulty as the final cause of a fertility decision. However, it may 
affect the action chain. A concrete example may, once again, prove useful. Given 
unsatisfactory housing conditions for a couple, the degree of expected uncertainty 
in a partners’ future labor condition and income may play a crucial role in the for-
mulation of the intention to have or to not have a child. After all, these labor uncer-
tainties sustain a narrative of the future in which it seems impossible to improve 
housing conditions. In this case, economic uncertainty may not be the final cause 
(the generic causality problem remains unsolved). But it leads to the decision 
because it highlights that the negative housing condition cannot be changed (causal 
chain continuity) and this defines the couple’s narrative of the future (the specific 
causality problem is addressed).
Not all the actions are taken under conscious deliberation and through the evoca-
tion of narratives. In daily life, routine prevails and imitation may play a central role 
in guiding actions without the need for narratives, or intentions or motivations. In 
these cases, narratives can be seen as an ex–post justification of a previous course of 
action without any specific claim for causality and any reason for the action. 
Nonetheless, the fertility decision is life–changing and is intimately matched with a 
narrative of future parenthood, irrespective of how simplistic or infeasible this 
future may appear to an external observer (Todd et al. 2013). On the one hand, nar-
ratives help individuals in selecting the relevant information from a given context, 
its interpretation and causal modeling. On the other hand, narratives provide crucial 
information to the researcher on what elements need to be considered to be relevant 
in a fertility choice. The researcher is, thus, helped in embedding the proposed 
explanation of the fertility intention in the social reality experienced by the actors.
3.7  Research Examples
The proposed Narrative Framework might offer a powerful approach to frame and 
operationalize the role of uncertainty in the fertility decision–making process. This 
is a novel approach in fertility research, making it hard to cite studies that success-
fully applied said framework. Nonetheless, the literature offers evidence that, on top 
of the actual economic outlook or objective insecurity, the perception  of one’s 
own economic situation, or anticipation of future downturns inhibits childbearing. 
Some studies use direct questions to respondents about how insecure they feel their 
own economic situation (Bhaumik and Nugent 2011; Kreyenfeld 2009) or how 
insecure they feel their jobs to be (Bernardi et al. 2008; Hanappi et al. 2017). The 
level of subjective well-being has been employed to capture unobserved amenities 
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of the job, such as prestige, infrastructure, or welfare provisions in the study of fer-
tility intentions (Vignoli et  al. 2020b).  Other  studies use survey questions about 
respondents’ knowledge about possible future events (Trinitapoli and Yeatman 
2011). Liefbroer (2005), employing a five–wave panel survey among young Dutch 
adults spanning 13 years, found that the timing of entry into motherhood is affected 
by anticipated costs to one’s career and to one’s level of individual autonomy, and 
by an anticipated increase in one’s sense of security. He also illustrated that antici-
pated costs to one’s career and spending power, and anticipated rewards in terms of 
one’s sense of security and quality of the partner relationship affect the timing of 
entry into fatherhood. In the following, we present two more studies where the 
importance of uncertain futures is explicitly considered.
The understanding of the complex interplay between the agency capacity and the 
structural constraints is at the core of recent developments in family research 
(Johnson-Hanks et  al. 2011; Huinink et  al. 2015). For instance, the qualitative 
research of Bernardi et al. (2008) studied the different roles played by an insecure 
job on fertility choices in what were once East and Western Germany after reunifi-
cation. The authors sustain that parents brought up in different cultural contexts 
(communist and capitalist) were socialized to different values and cultural frame-
works. This circumstance has consequences for the role that labor insecurity may 
play in fertility decision. Their conclusion was that socialization and cultural values 
play a crucial role in shaping imaginaries about the right job for having a child: in 
the West, fertility is usually postponed until after reaching career goals, whereas in 
the East childbearing and professional life represent parallel paths. While this expla-
nation of the emergence of a life course narrative may account for the specific case 
under study, different contexts may see different generative mechanisms of narra-
tives and elements at work (i.e., shared narratives of media and peers). In addition, 
cultural values and cognitive frameworks may remain valid during a long period and 
influence expectations, imaginaries and narratives. But, equally, they may sharply 
change and support a new life course narrative.
Alternatively, a recent article by Gatta et al. (2019) proposed an operationaliza-
tion of two dimensions of perceived employment uncertainty—stability and resil-
ience—and tested their relevance for predicting fertility intentions, net of 
socio–economic structural constraints. To this end, they relied on a unique survey 
that covers an array of variables measuring employment uncertainty vis á vis respon-
dents’ fertility intentions, the Trustlab survey for Italy (Aassve et al. 2018). Perceived 
resilience to job loss seems of particular relevance in fertility planning, outperform-
ing objective indicators of employment status and characteristics. The observed sig-
nificance and strength of association between perceived employment resilience and 
fertility intentions remains strong after the introduction of person–specific controls 
for individuals’ risk attitudes in the model equation. In addition, the effect of per-
ceived resilience to job loss did not vary significantly in regions with a higher share 
of fixed–term contracts or higher unemployment rates. In sum, the study by Gatta 
et al. (2019) advanced the importance of considering how different expectations of 
the future influence fertility intentions, net of the actual individual–level 
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employment circumstances, person–specific heterogeneity in risk attitudes, and tak-
ing into account the moderating role of the macroeconomic context.
These research examples highlight how expectations, imagination, and the abil-
ity to devise different scenarios may play a major role in planning the future.
3.8  Conclusions
We argued that narratives of the future constitute a crucial element in the fertility 
decision–making process. In a condition of fundamental uncertainty, the future is 
not ergodic or merely the statistical shadow of the past (Davidson 2010: 17) and, as 
such, subject only to random changes (Beckert and Bronk 2018). A major short-
coming in the application of the traditional fertility frameworks is connected to 
backwards reasoning (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011): indicators and statistical models 
consider what already happened in life, without taking into account the sources of 
uncertainty of the expected future. At the micro–level, actors are always in a present 
condition where the past already took place—often independently of the actors’ 
wishes—and the future is yet to come in a specific form. Hence, planning a present 
action means aligning elements of the past in the light of an expected or imag-
ined future.
There is no doubt that understanding historical trajectories is indispensable to understand-
ing the social phenomena of the present. However, events in the social world cannot be 
explained by the past alone. Actors’ decisions are determined by more than existing struc-
tures and past experiences—they are shaped in equal measure by perceptions of the future 
(Beckert 2016: 35).
The action under uncertain conditions requires narratives of the future capable to 
reduce uncertainty and sustain commitment because outcomes are not necessarily 
“implied in the present” (Buchanan and Vanberg 1991: 170). Individuals who are 
uncertain about their future income or earning opportunities may shy away from 
long–term commitments and, thus, postpone leaving the parental home, setting up 
their own household, and having children. The fundamental uncertainty in fertility 
decisions, reinforced during globalization, makes narratives of the future pivotal in 
generating a level of commitment sufficient enough to act:
Narratives create experienced rather than just abstract ‘knowledge’: they provide support 
for action founded on an emotionally coloured and subjective feeling of ‘knowing’ what 
will happen (Tuckett 2018: 74).
We believe that the Narrative Framework will help to understand contemporary 
fertility dynamics. We do not advocate that perceived economic uncertainty is the 
only factor responsible for the fertility decline observed in recent years across 
Europe and the US. However, analyses that simultaneously include numerous objec-
tive indicators such as the unemployment rate, the cost of public debt and consumer 
confidence index, do not entirely explain the decline in birth rates in Europe and the 
US, 2008–2013 (Comolli 2017; Matysiak et al. 2020). Moreover, value change can 
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of course be an additional factor contributing to fertility decline, but this is most 
likely to be a long–term trend, which is unlikely to be so concentrated in the after-
math of the Great Recession. Here, we argue that part of this unexplained fertility 
decline can be clarified by the rise of uncertainty, a condition in which the future 
cannot be deduced from present information. Narratives of the future are contingent 
tools to cope with the uncertainty that people face: they are not just a mirror of the 
socialization period, but they are always shaped by contingent external forces that 
may accomplish or thwart the established and expected life course. Indeed, narra-
tives allow people to act according to the uncertainty they face (e.g. avoiding having 
children) or despite uncertainty (e.g. trying to have children).
We conclude that the study of fertility decisions cannot disregard the condition 
of uncertainty in which they are taken and, especially, its future–oriented nature. 
The increasing uncertainty of a given prospect does not imply more unintelligible or 
chaotic behavior. Rather, the role of uncertainty in the fertility decision–making 
process can be assessed. Subjective reasoning and decision–making processes often 
rely on what people expect will happen, or what they are trying to achieve, and this 
became more important in the era of globalization–induced uncertainty. The 
Narratives Framework contributes to the study of the decision–making process in a 
condition of uncertainty, allowing the researcher to assess whether, to what extent, 
and what elements of an uncertain context influence the fertility decision. We wish 
that future research will operationalize the Narrative Framework, testing its compo-
nents in connection with fertility, while disentangling the effects of uncertainty 
from other factors.
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